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I am delighted to speak here at Vanderbilt regarding the U.S.
Government's perspective on Foreign Official Immunity after
Samantar v. Yousuf.' In the Samantar case, the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously held that the immunity of foreign government officials
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sued in their personal capacity in U.S. courts, including for alleged
human rights violations, is not controlled by the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976,2 but rather, by immunity determinations
made by the Executive Branch. Let me break my topic today into
three parts: first, the world of foreign official immunity as it existed
before the Samantar case; second, the Supreme Court's decision in
Samantar and its implications; and third, the State Department's
"New Samantar Process," which has been emerging since the
Supreme Court's decision-focusing, in particular, on distinguishing
what we call Samantar issues from non-Samantar issues, the effect of
a State Department suggestion of immunity, and the effect of State
Department silence with respect to a foreign official's claim of
immunity.
I. THE WORLD BEFORE SAMANTAR
As almost every American international lawyer knows, the world
before the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was one in which the
U.S. Executive Branch was long considered the appropriate body to
determine official immunity by providing courts with so-called
suggestions of immunity. The State Department's practice regarding
foreign official immunity grew out of its historical practice regarding
foreign sovereign immunity. The 1812 decision in The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon set out the early framework for foreign
sovereign immunity, whereby wrongs perpetrated by foreign
sovereigns were recognized as appropriate "for diplomatic, rather
than legal," resolution.3 Due to the potentially significant foreign
policy consequences of subjecting another sovereign state to suit in
our courts, the courts looked to the "political branch of the
government charged with the conduct of foreign affairs" to decide
whether immunity should be recognized. 4
Traditionally, the State Department provided the judiciary with
suggestions of immunity, based upon the Department's judgments
regarding customary international law and reciprocal practice.5
Before 1952, the State Department followed a theory of absolute
foreign sovereign immunity for friendly sovereigns. Under that
doctrine, "a sovereign cannot, without [its] consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign" regardless of the
nature of the acts alleged to have been committed. 6 The Department
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2006).
3. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137, 146 (1812).
4. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945).
5. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983).
6. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551
U.S. 193, 199 (2007) (quoting Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep't of
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would file "suggestions of immunity" with the court, invoking
considerations of international law and international comity to
request sovereign immunity in particular cases, and the U.S. courts
generally gave absolute deference to those suggestions.7 As the State
Department's practice with regard to suggestions of immunity
evolved over time, courts came to adopt a two-track process, under
either track looking to State Department policy to see whether official
immunity was appropriate. Under one track-which I will call the
"suggestion" track-if the State Department offered a suggestion of
immunity, the court would allow that immunity and dismiss the case.
Under the second track-which I will call the "silence" track-if the
State Department stayed silent in a case where a foreign official's
immunity was at issue, the court would decide on its own "whether
all the requisites for such immunity existed," considering "whether
the ground of immunity is one which it is the established policy of
[the State Department] to recognize."8
In 1952, Acting Legal Adviser of the State Department, Jack
Tate,9 sent a famous letter to the Acting Attorney General that
became known as the "Tate Letter."1 0 The Tate Letter announced the
United States' adherence to the "restrictive theory" of sovereign
immunity, which extended immunity to a foreign state for its public
acts, but not for its commercial acts. Tate pointed out that the
"widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of
engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which
will enable persons doing business with them to have their rights
determined in the courts" and that this shift away from absolute
immunity was consistent with the practices of other countries." The
Tate Letter marked a tectonic shift in immunity theory, inasmuch as
it recognized that the commercial revolution, in which virtually all
foreign states had become involved, had caused their entry into the
global marketplace in a way that required a move away from an
State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att'y Gen. (May 19, 1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter],
reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952)).
7. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2285 (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 5, intro. note (1987).
8. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2284 (quoting Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36 and Ex
parte Republic of Peru 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943)).
9. For the historical record, let me note with pride my own passing connection
with the great Jack Tate, and the opposite paths that we took to arrive here in
Tennessee. I was lucky enough to serve as Dean of Yale Law School, to become the
Legal Adviser in 2009, and to come here to Tennessee for this keynote lecture. Jack
Tate took the inverse path. Born in Bolivar, Tennessee, in 1902, he graduated from the
University of Tennessee at Knoxville in 1924. After his historic service as Acting Legal
Adviser, he moved to New Haven, Connecticut, where he served for many years as the
beloved Deputy Dean of Yale Law School. There, he showed great kindness to my
whole family, and his wonderful wife Elizabeth became my older sister's revered high
school English teacher!
10. Tate Letter, supra note 6, at 984-85.
11. Id. at 985.
2011] 1143
VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
unyielding doctrine of absolute foreign sovereign immunity toward a
more nuanced doctrine of restrictive foreign sovereign immunity by
executive suggestion.
After 1952, the State Department relied upon the restrictive
theory to inform any suggestions of immunity it provided to courts,
whether with respect to foreign sovereigns, agencies or
instrumentalities, or foreign officials, and courts largely continued to
defer to the Department's case-by-case suggestions.12 During the next
quarter century, the State Department rendered only four reported
determinations with respect to immunity, in the absence of an
applicable treaty or statute, in suits against individual foreign
officials who were not heads of state.1 3
In several respects, the practice of executive suggestions of
immunity with respect to foreign states was flawed. First, as several
Legal Advisers acknowledged, the informality of the State
Department's internal procedures did not provide the sort of process
that sovereign states believed was due.1 4 Second, critics charged that
12. See Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the
U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 219-20.
13. See generally Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State,
May 1952 to January 1977, 1977 DIGEST, at 1017 [hereinafter Sovereign Immunity
Decisions]. In 1960, after the State Department recognized immunity, the court
dismissed a suit against a Canadian consular officer who was sued for making
statements to induce the plaintiff to move to Canada, on the ground that "[a] consular
official is immune from suit when the acts complained of were performed in the course
of his official duties." Waltier v. Thomson, 189 F. Supp. 319, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). In an
unpublished 1968 civil rights suit against a Jamaican labor organization and its liaison
officer, Cole v. Heidtman (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the State Department denied immunity for
the labor organization and the officer on the ground that the activities were of a private
nature, under the Tate Letter. See Sovereign Immunity Decisions, supra, at 1062-63.
In two other cases-Semonian v. Crosbie, Civil Action No. 74-4893-T (D. Mass. 1974),
and Greenspan v. Crosbie, No. 74 Civ. 4734 (GLG), 1976 WL 841 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23,
1976)-the State Department suggested immunity for officials of the Province of
Newfoundland sued by shareholders of a Canadian corporation regarding a timber
sales agreement, noting that "although it is alleged that the defendant
officials . . . acted in excess of their authority, it is not alleged that these officials acted
other than in their official capacities and on behalf of the Province . . . ." Sovereign
Immunity Decisions, supra, at 1076.
14. Critics charged that rules of evidence were not observed; that there was no
full presentation of competing arguments, no particular time period within which the
Department had to make a decision, and no right to review State Department
documents which provided the basis or the reasons for its final determination; and that
plaintiffs were not always notified of the Department's decision whether or not to file.
See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and
Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 94 (1976)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 11315] (testimony of Michael Cardozo). In 1973, then-
Acting Legal Adviser Charles Brower described the process as a "reasonably informal"
"internal procedure which permits the litigants and the interested parties involved to
have a hearing within the Department and they present written statements,
sometimes come in and present oral statements . . . heard in the Department. Once the
decision is made on the basis of the hearing . .. there is no judicial recourse from it."
Immunities of Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims
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the State Department did not always follow the Tate Letter criteria,
leading to inconsistent results under the State Department process.15
Third, the process arguably brought too much political pressure to
bear on the State Department, which was incessantly lobbied by
foreign states to support immunity requests. 16 Yet despite these
criticisms, the Department found it useful to retain flexibility to take
foreign relations concerns into account on a case-by-case basis.
Partly in response to these critiques, in 1976, with State
Department support, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA), which codified the standards for foreign state
immunity and "transferred primary responsibility for immunity
determinations to the Judicial Branch."17 From the beginning, the
Executive Branch saw the FSIA, by its terms, as applying only to
foreign states, not to foreign officials,' 8 and continued to assert that
State Department immunity determinations were required in cases
involving foreign officials. The courts divided on this issue.19 In 1992,
Congress legislated in the area of human rights litigation by enacting
the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which does not expressly
and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 27 (1973)
(statement of Charles Brower, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State). In 1976, Legal Adviser
Monroe Leigh acknowledged: "We in the Department of State and Legal Adviser's office
do not have the means of really conducting a quasi-judicial hearing to determine
whether, as a matter of international law, immunity should be granted in a given case.
Among other things, we don't have the power to compel testimony or to take testimony
under oath or any of the normal indicia of a true judicial hearing. So we are not in a
position really to conduct the kind of inquiry that ought to be conducted to determine
whether it's a proper case for allowing sovereign immunity to be applied." Hearings on
H.R. 11315, supra, at 34 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State).
15. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 11315, supra note 14, at 58 (testimony of Peter
Trooboff, Att'y) ("The current practice has caused inequitable results for private
litigants as a result of departmental suggestions of immunity in commercial cases.");
see also Bradley & Helfer, supra note 12, at 220 ("[Iln some cases a foreign state would
seek an immunity determination from the State Department and in other cases the
state would ask the court to make its own determination. The result was that
'sovereign immunity determinations were made in two different branches, subject to a
variety of factors, sometimes including diplomatic considerations' Perhaps not
surprisingly, this regime did not always produce consistent decisions." (footnotes
omitted)).
16. See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Litigating a Sovereign Immunity Claim-
The Haiti Case, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 377, 390 (1974).
17. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 691 (2004).
18. See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100-01 (9th Cir
1990) (discussing the U.S. position).
19. Compare Samantar v. Yousuf, 552 F.3d 371, 381 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding
the FSIA does not govern the immunity of individual foreign officials), aff'd, 130 S. Ct.
2278 (2010), and Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005) (same),
with In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 81 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
that the FSIA governs individual official immunity), and Keller v. Cent. Bank of
Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815-16 (6th Cir. 2002) (same), and Byrd v. Corporaci6n Forestal
y Industrial de Olancho, S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1999) (same), and El-Fadl
v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same), and Chuidian, 912
F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990) (same).
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speak to immunity, but creates a cause of action for damages against
individuals who, "under actual or apparent authority, or color of law,
of any foreign nation," commit acts of torture or "extrajudicial
killing."20
II. SAMANTAR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
In 2010, in Samantar v. Yousuf, the Supreme Court accepted the
U.S. Government's position that the FSIA does not govern immunity
for foreign officials sued in their personal capacity. Defendant
Mohamed Ali Samantar had served as First Vice President, Prime
Minister, and Minister of Defense of Somalia under the Siad Barre
regime in the 1980s, before fleeing to the United States. Somali
plaintiffs, who included naturalized U.S. citizens, brought suit
against Samantar under the TVPA and the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA) in federal court in Virginia, alleging his command
responsibility for terrorizing the civilian population of Somalia with
widespread and systematic use of torture, arbitrary detention, and
extrajudicial killing. Although the United States had recognized the
Barre regime, the United States has not recognized any government
since its fall. The U.S. Government declined to participate in the
litigation before either the district court or the Fourth Circuit.
After the district court dismissed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding-consistent with the U.S.
Government's longstanding view-that the FSIA applies only to
foreign states and not to foreign officials, and remanded the case to
the district court for consideration of what immunity, if any, should
apply in these circumstances. The Supreme Court unanimously
affirmed, clarifying that, as we had said, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act does not govern the immunity of foreign officials. The
Court held that the FSIA applies only to states, not individual
officials. The decision turned on statutory construction; the Court
held that the clear language of the statute, coupled with its
legislative history, indicated that Congress did not intend to include
foreign officials.2 ' The Court emphasized that the trial court could
consider on remand whether Samantar might be entitled to common
20. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified at U.S.C. § 1350(a) note (2006)).
21. "Reading the FSIA as a whole," Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, "there
is nothing to suggest we should read 'foreign state' in [the statute] to include an official
acting on behalf of the foreign state, and much to indicate that this meaning was not
what Congress enacted." Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289 (2010). Nor, the
Court concluded, did the background, purposes, and legislative history of the FSIA
indicate that Congress had attempted to codify the common law doctrine of foreign
official immunity in a statute designed to codify the common law governing foreign
state sovereign immunity. See id. at 2289-90.
[VOL. 44.11411146
U S. PERSPECTIVE ON IMMUNITYAFTER SAMANTAI 1
law immunities, but declined to offer guidance as to the scope of these
immunities.
What are the implications of the Samantar decision? Obviously,
we in the U.S. Government believe that Samantar was correctly
decided. The decision was consistent with the longstanding executive
branch view that the text, structure, and legislative history of the
FSIA demonstrate that Congress did not intend the FSIA to govern
individual officials' immunity. As a practical matter, based on
historical experience, unless Congress passes legislation to govern
official immunity, as it did with respect to foreign state immunity in
the FSIA, we expect courts will again look to the State Department
for authoritative guidance as to whether a foreign official enjoys
immunity.
Before the enactment of the FSIA, courts recognized foreign
official immunity in a variety of contexts. As in suits against foreign
states, the courts traditionally deferred to the State Department's
judgment whether an official should be accorded immunity in a given
case,2 2 and in cases where the State Department was silent, courts
applied the principles articulated by the Department.2 3 Thus, if
courts follow historical practice, they will again request the State
Department's "determinations regarding immunity" to decide
whether or not to grant immunity to individuals for actions taken as
foreign officials. When the Department is silent, courts may apply
State Department principles to determine whether or not immunity is
warranted.
Some commentators have already suggested that Samantar's
deference to State Department immunity determinations marks an
unfortunate return to the "bad old days" of executive suggestion. 24
But we at the State Department are more optimistic. In general, we
consider it a good idea for courts in such cases to seek executive
guidance, for the simple reason that institutionally, the State
Department is best situated to establish the initial framework for
making decisions regarding foreign official immunity, and best-
positioned in the long run to consider the remedial, substantive, and
prudential concerns raised by suits against foreign officials.
After all, there is nothing new about the State Department
making recommendations to courts regarding the immunity of
individuals. To the contrary, the Department has been making such
recommendations all along in numerous other litigation contexts.
Even after the enactment of the FSIA in 1976, the Department's
22. See, e.g., Greenspan v. Crosbie, No. 74 Civ. 4734 (GLG), 1976 WL 841, at
*1-2 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 23, 1976); Waltier v. Thomson, 189 F. Supp. 319, 320-21 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
23. See Heaney v. Gov't of Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1971).
24. See, e.g., Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S.
Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA.. INT'LL. 915, 917 (2011).
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practice of suggesting rationae personae (or status-based) immunities
continued undisturbed. For example, we have regularly provided
guidance in cases regarding the immunity of heads of state,25 the
immunity of foreign officials on "special missions" for their
governments, 26 and the immunity of diplomats in cases brought
against them by their former domestic servants.27 It is precisely
because these determinations of individual immunity involve such a
complex set of factors that courts have long trusted the State
Department to play the lead role. Indeed, the U.S. Government's
Supreme Court amicus brief in Samantar-signed, inter alia, by
then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan and myself-argued that:
The conclusion that the FSIA does not govern foreign official immunity
is reinforced by the number of complexities that could attend the
immunity determination in this and other cases-complexities that
could not be accommodated under the rigid and ill-fitting statutory
regime of the FSIA. Even in an ordinary case, in considering whether to
recognize immunity of a foreign official under the generally applicable
principles of immunity discussed above, the Executive might find it
appropriate to take into account issues of reciprocity, customary
international law and state practice, the immunity of the state itself,
and, when appropriate, domestic precedents. But in this case, the
Executive may also find the nature of the acts alleged-and whether
they should properly be regarded as actions in an official capacity-to
be relevant to the immunity determination.
2 8
We argued, in effect, that determinations of official immunity are
derivative of, but not identical to, determinations of state immunity.
Even within foreign governments, individuals may change roles, and
the immunity to which they are entitled may change as they do.
25. See, e.g., Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004).
26. See, e.g., Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2008).
27. See, e.g., Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
28. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 24-
25, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555) [hereinafter United
States Samantar Brief]. Elsewhere, the U.S. brief similarly noted:
Th[e conclusion that] foreign officials' immunity continues to be governed by
the generally applicable principles of immunity articulated by the Executive
Branch . . . derives additional support from the complexity of certain official
immunity determinations, which could not be accommodated under the rigid
statutory framework of the FSIA. In this case, for example, the Executive
reasonably could find it appropriate to take into account petitioner's residence
in the United States rather than Somalia, the nature of the acts alleged,
respondents' invocation of the statutory right of action in the TVPA against
torture and extrajudicial killing, and the lack of any recognized government of
Somalia that could opine on whether petitioner's alleged actions were taken in
an official capacity or that could decide whether to waive any immunity that
petitioner otherwise might enjoy. It is unlikely that Congress, in enacting the
FSIA, intended to divest the Executive of the ability to evaluate complex
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Determining the degree of individual immunity to which current and
former foreign officials may be entitled for their various acts while in
office is a complex legal determination that entails a careful weighing
of factors that the State Department is in the best position to
perform.
In sum, the Court's Samantar decision clarified a number of
issues, while leaving others to be determined. First, Samantar makes
clear that the immunity of individual foreign officials derives from
federal common law standards, not from the statutory standards of
the FSIA. Accordingly, Samantar's own case was remanded so that
the trial court could consider what common law immunities might be
available to that former official. 29 Second, historically, and now once
again, courts must look to the State Department to suggest principles
governing the immunities of foreign officials. Third, as our amicus
brief in Samantar indicated, in making this determination,
application of a highly rigid framework is not appropriate, given the
flexibility we need to consider complex case-specific issues relying on
a non-exhaustive range of factors.
III. THE EMERGING POST-SAMANTAR PROCESS
After the Supreme Court's ruling, we in the State Department's
Legal Adviser's Office have begun establishing a new process for
making determinations regarding the immunity of foreign officials
after Samantar. This "New Samantar Process," we believe, will be an
improvement over the pre-FSIA process, which we have carefully
analyzed in an effort to avoid repeating old mistakes. Although some
question whether the State Department should be making these
decisionsA0 we believe that the Department is better equipped today
than it was when it lacked the necessary resources to appropriately
evaluate such immunity issues in all cases. The Samantar Court
29. On remand, the State Department determined that Samantar was not
entitled to immunity, and the district court accepted that determination. At this
writing, the case is on appeal to the Fourth Circuit, where the United States has filed
an amicus brief. For further discussion of these subsequent developments, see infra
notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Wuerth, supra note 24. In his submission to this Symposium and
elsewhere, my predecessor John Bellinger suggests that we should consider ourselves
"the dog who caught the car," because of the "enormous burden" he fears will be visited
on the Legal Adviser's Office by the task of making Samantar determinations. See, e.g.,
John Bellinger III, Ruling Burdens State Dept., 32 NAT'L L.J., June 28, 2010, at 47
("The Obama administration will now be buffeted by competing demands from foreign
governments for protection for their officials and from human rights advocates for
accountability for human rights abusers."); John Bellinger III, The Dog that Caught the
Car: Observations on the Past, Present, and Future Approaches of the Office of the Legal
Adviser to Official Acts Immunities, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819 (2011). But up to
this point, although there has been an uptick in immunity requests after Samantar, we
have found this workload entirely manageable.
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made clear that it found "no reason to believe that Congress saw as a
problem, or wanted to eliminate, the State Department's role in
determinations regarding individual official immunity."3' As the
Court observed, before the FSIA was enacted, when the State
Department suggested that a foreign sovereign defendant was
immune from suit, courts surrendered jurisdiction over a case.32 Or,
as the Second Circuit put it, "once the State Department has ruled in
a matter of this nature, the judiciary will not interfere."33 These
judicial rulings recognize that the State Department, in consultation
with others in the Executive Branch, remains best positioned to
consider the policy, remedial, substantive, and prudential concerns
raised by suits against officials, for at least four reasons.
First, the Department remains the Executive Branch's
acknowledged expert on international law and the immunities that
flow from it.34 There are roughly 180 lawyers in my office whose
specialty is the interpretation, application, and development of
international law. The Legal Adviser's Office has unrivaled
knowledge of treaties, conventions, and international instruments of
all stripes. We participate in the negotiating process at every level on
every multilateral agreement, and we are likewise intimately
involved with the study, interpretation, and formation of customary
international law. We also follow closely what other countries do with
respect to their domestic law, and how they evaluate international
law. Given our expertise in this area, we are best situated to offer
guidance on the content of evolving international law principles
relevant to determining whether our federal common law of official
immunity provides immunity in any given case.
Second, the State Department has longstanding, special
expertise in this precise area. For decades, the Department has
played the lead role in formulating and applying the relevant
executive branch principles-informed by customary international
law and practice-which recognize that both current and former
officials of a foreign state usually enjoy common law immunity for
acts undertaken in their official capacity.35 The scope of immunity
that individual foreign officials enjoy under traditional principles can
be either broader or narrower than the immunity of the state itself.36
31. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291.
32. Id. at 2285.
33. Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (1971).
34. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983).
35. See, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577, 579-80 (2d Cir. 1895), aff'd,
168 U.S. 250 (1897).
36. In some circumstances, the individual immunity will be narrower than
state immunity. For example, a foreign state may be immune for any acts unless one of
the FSIA's exceptions applies, whereas individual officials are usually immune only for
acts taken in official capacity. Conversely, in other circumstances, individual immunity
can be broader than foreign state immunity. The Executive Branch has on occasion
suggested immunity for an individual official even when the state would lack immunity
11]0o [VOL. 44:1141
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Third, as the home of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor (which I was honored to head during the Clinton
Administration) and the author of the annual Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices, the State Department remains the agency
best situated to keep track of changes in international human rights
practice and norms. In the same way that the law of foreign state
immunity eventually took into account the global commercial
revolution, official immunity law will need to take into account the
human rights revolution. Just as the Tate Letter acknowledged an
important watershed in state practice-the increasing entry of
governments into international commercial markets-changes in
international human rights norms, as reflected in treaties ratified by
the United States, new U.S. statutes, and U.S. judicial doctrines,
have given rise to new views about the boundaries of official action
appropriately subject to immunity, and call for review of the
standards governing personal accountability for gross human rights
abuses.3 7
Fourth, the State Department is best situated to evaluate the
foreign policy and reciprocal consequences of subjecting a foreign
official to suit in U.S. courts.38 In some settings, personal damage
actions against foreign officials may unduly chill their performance of
duties, trigger reciprocity concerns about the treatment of U.S.
officials sued in foreign courts, and potentially interfere with the
Executive Branch's conduct of foreign affairs. The Department daily
grapples with the impact of litigation on foreign states, and is best
positioned to distinguish "genuine" Samantar issues, which involve
complex questions of official conduct, from distinct legal issues, such
as pure status questions and procedural issues including personal
jurisdiction, service of process, forum non conveniens, indispensible
parties, and real parties in interest.
In our filing before the Eastern District of Virginia, we
determined that Samantar was not immune from suit based on a
number of factors, including the facts of the case in conjunction with
"the applicable principles of customary international law."3 9 We
noted, among other things, that the defendant was a U.S. resident
sued inter alia by a U.S. citizen, that he was a former official who
for the same conduct. See Greenspan v. Crosbie, No. 74 Civ. 4734 (GLG), 1976 WL 841,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 23, 1976) (official immunity for commercial activities).
37. Current common law doctrine, statutes, treaties, and customary
international law may impose obligations to hold accountable those who commit gross
violations of human rights that did not exist when the Executive Branch and courts
first addressed the immunity of foreign government officials.
38. See, e.g., Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[T]he degree to
which granting or denying a claim of immunity may be important to foreign policy is a
question on which the judiciary is particularly ill-equipped to second-guess the
executive. The executive's institutional resources and expertise in foreign affairs far
outstrip those of the judiciary.").
39. United States Samantar Brief, supra note 28, at 7.
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would enjoy only residual immunity for acts taken in an official
capacity, and that Somalia has no currently recognized government
that could either assert or waive its immunity or assert that the
relevant acts were taken in an official capacity. We also considered
"the overall impact of this matter on the foreign policy of the United
States," and ultimately determined that Samantar was not immune
from suit. Soon thereafter, based on our determination of non-
immunity, the district court rejected Samantar's motion to dismiss,
and at this writing, the matter is on appeal before the Fourth
Circuit.40
A. Five Tenets of Official Immunity Practice
While it may be some time before the Executive Branch develops
a full-fledged U.S. Government statement of official immunity
principles-a definitive "Koh Letter," if you will, parallel to those
principles found in the 1952 Tate Letter-it is not too early to discern
at least five basic tenets that we will apply in our official immunity
practice.
The first, as acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Samantar
itself, is that when State Department determinations of immunity
and non-immunity are made in particular cases, the courts should
defer to those State Department determinations.41 Such deference is
due both to State Department determinations with respect to the
40. The United States has filed a brief as amicus curiae in the appeal, arguing
that the district court correctly relied on the State Department's determination in
denying the motion to dismiss. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellees, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 11-1479 (4th Cir. Oct. 24, 2011).
In the related case of Ahmed v. Magan, at the request of District Judge Smith, the
State Department recently determined that defendant Abdi Aden Magan was not
entitled to immunity in a suit brought by a Somali plaintiff in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio under the TVPA and ATCA for alleged responsibility
for torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and arbitrary detention. See Order,
Ahmed, No. 2:10-cv-34 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2010); Statement of Interest of the United
States at 1-2, 7, Ahmed, No. 2:10-cv-34 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Magan
Statement of Interest]. The U.S. Government's filing noted, inter alia, that: (1) Magan
is a former, not sitting, official of a state with no current government formally
recognized by the United States who generally would enjoy only residual immunity,
unless waived, and even then only for acts that may properly be considered authorized
by the foreign state; (2) plaintiff had alleged that while in office, Magan "directed and
participated in the interrogation and torture of Plaintiff and other civilians perceived
as opponents of the Barre regime"; and (3) Magan resides in the United States, and
basic principles of sovereignty provide that a state generally has a right to exercise
jurisdiction over its residents. See Magan Statement of Interest, supra.
41. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2291 (2010) ("[There is] no reason
to believe that Congress [in passing the FSIA] saw as a problem, or wanted to
eliminate, the State Department's role in determinations regarding individual official
immunity."); see also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) ("It is
therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to
allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit
to recognize." (footnote omitted)).
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status of foreign officials and with respect to the character of the
acts.42
A second conclusion that can be drawn from Samantar is that,
absent a treaty or statute, general principles regarding immunity
articulated by the State Department will govern foreign official
immunity as a matter of federal common law.4 3 Again, this is nothing
new. For more than seventy years, both before and after the Tate
Letter and enactment of the FSIA, the federal common law of
immunity has given force not just to case-specific immunity
determinations but also to principles of immunity articulated by the
State Department.44
A third tenet is that the immunities of foreign officials belong to
the foreign state-not to the officials personally-and thus, it has
been historically recognized that those immunities may be waived by
the foreign state.45 States recognize special protections for officials
where the balance of public interests requires even deserving
claimants to find remedies outside of court systems. But it is also
important to remember that official immunity does not extinguish
liability; states and their officials may still bear responsibility for the
underlying conduct, and the individuals themselves may be subject to
suit, including criminal prosecution. 46 Just because an official may
not be sued in a foreign court for an official act does not mean that
the liability of the individual cannot be established elsewhere. Nor
does it mean that the state's own responsibility cannot be addressed
through some other mechanism, such as claims settlement or some
other form of international remedy. Moreover, as a policy matter,
because the U.S. Government is pressing for advancement of the rule
of law internationally, this approach should lead in the longer term to
reduced need for recourse to U.S. courts for injuries abroad, as more
effective domestic remedies become available.
Fourth, in making official immunity determinations, the State
Department will distinguish carefully between those immunities that
42. See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198,
1200 (2d Cir. 1971) (deferring to State Department determination that alleged conduct
was "of a public, as opposed to a private/commercial nature").
43. See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292-93. As an academic, I discussed federal
common law rules governing foreign affairs in Harold Hongju Koh, Is International
Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998).
44. See, e.g., Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 34-36; Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S.
578, 588-89 (1943); The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1938).
45. See Statement of Interest of the United States 1 10, Yousuf v. Samantar,
No. 1:04 CV 1360 (IMB) (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2011); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 1 61 (Feb. 14) (foreign officials "will cease to
enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the State which they represent or have
represented decides to waive that immunity").
46. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 61 ("[S]uch persons enjoy
no criminal immunity under international law in their own countries, and may thus be
tried by those countries' courts in accordance with the relevant rules of domestic law.").
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are based on a person's status and those immunities that are based on
a person's claimed official acts. As a number of articles in this
Symposium have discussed, 47 there is a historical distinction between
status immunities (immunities ratione personae)-i.e., immunities
that apply to individual officials because of their current status,
which are designed to protect their ability to carry out current
functions (diplomatic, head of state, special missions)-and conduct
immunities (immunities ratione materiae), which derive from the
nature of those individuals' conduct and protect centrally against
inappropriate judicial oversight of foreign government conduct. Thus,
certain foreign officials-such as sitting heads of state, diplomats,
and members of qualifying special missions-are entitled to
immunities by virtue of their status, during the time they hold that
status. Thereafter, as former officials, they are entitled only to those
conduct immunities that attach to challenged acts that can be deemed
official in nature, which may depend upon the nature of their former
office. 48 Obviously, whether an act may be considered "official" for
conduct immunity purposes also depends upon on the nature of the
act alleged.49 A government official's legitimate authority has not
generally been thought to encompass a right to commit "official acts"
that violate both international and domestic law.50
47. See David P. Stewart, The Immunity of State Officials Under the UN
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 44 VAND. J.
TRANAT'L L. 1047, 1056 (2011); see also Chimkne I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity
After Samantar, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 837, 838 (2011); Lewis S. Yelin, Head of
State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 911, 921
(2011).
48. A similar distinction between status and conduct immunities is found in
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
500 U.N.T.S. 95, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T 3227, 1 U.N.T.S. 16.
49. The Samantar decision notes, for example, a difference "as a matter of
common law principles" between immunity "for acts committed in official capacity" and
acts "beyond the scope of official authority." Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291 n.17; see also
United States Samantar Brief, supra note 28, at 11 ("[T]he immunity of foreign officials
arises from the official character of their acts."). Whether or not an act is "official" does
not turn on whether the act is attributable to the state. Under international law,
attribution to a state for purposes of state responsibility is a question distinct from the
question of an individual's responsibility for that act. Compare Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec.
12, 2001) ('The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to
exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State
under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it
exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions."), with id. art. 58 ("These articles are
without prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility under international
law of any person acting on behalf of a State.").
50. Pre-Samantar case law treated acts in violation of international and
domestic law as falling outside the scope of "official acts." See, e.g., Enahoro v.
Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that "officials receive no immunity
for acts that violate international jus cogens human rights norms (which by definition
are not legally authorized acts)"); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th
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Fifth, and crucially, not every issue involving a foreign official
will raise a Samantar issue that goes to the defendant's substantive
immunity from suit. Even after Samantar, we expect that many cases
can be disposed of, instead, based upon what we call "non-Samantar
issues," which broadly depend upon the defendant's status
immunities or various procedural considerations.
B. Non-Samantar Status Issues
As already noted, State Department determinations of status
immunity are nothing new-we have been making such
recommendations throughout the FSIA era, and they will continue as
before. These include, for example, cases involving claims of head of
state immunity, immunity for diplomatic agents, and special missions
immunity. Technically speaking, these are not pure "Samantar"
cases, which require a fuller assessment of a foreign official's conduct
as well as his or her status.
Cases disposed of purely on status grounds fall into four broad
categories. First, with respect to sitting heads of state, over the past
several decades, the Executive Branch has retained its traditional
pre-FSIA authority to suggest immunity from suit. A number of
courts have held that a suggestion of immunity by the Executive
Branch on behalf of a sitting head of state is binding upon the federal
courts and must be accepted as conclusive.5 1 Those same immunities
have not been routinely extended to former heads of state,5 2 although
some courts have acknowledged that former heads of state enjoy
certain immunities based on a combination of their past status and
conduct.53
Cir. 1994) (noting that Marcos's "acts of torture, execution, and disappearance were
clearly acts outside of his authority as President"); see also Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991, S. REP. No. 102-249, at 8 (1991) ("[Blecause no state officially condones
torture or extrajudicial killings, few such acts, if any, would fall under the rubric of
'official actions' taken in the course of an official's duties.").
51. See, e.g., Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 2004).
52. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 61 (Feb. 14) ("[A]fter a person ceases to hold the office of [head of state], he or she
will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other
States.").
53. Recently, for example, Judge Bates of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled that former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe enjoys
residual immunity from being forced to testify as a witness in a TVPA/ATCA suit
against Drummond Company. Balcero Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 1:10-mc-00764
(JDB), 2011 WL 3926372, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2011). Uribe had been been served
with a subpoena by a Georgetown University law student while teaching at
Georgetown. In response to a request from Judge Bates, we filed a pleading stating
that the former President "enjoys residual immunity from this Court's jurisdiction
insofar as Plaintiffs seek information (i) relating to acts taken in his official capacity as
a government official; or (ii) obtained in his official capacity as a government official."
Statement of Interest and Suggestion of Immunity of and by the United States at 1,
Balcero Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 1:10-mc-00764 (JDB) (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2011).
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Second, in cases brought against sitting diplomats and consular
officials, the Executive Branch has filed indications of diplomatic and
consular immunity where appropriate under the relevant Vienna
Conventions. 54
Third, the U.S. Government has also expressed its view as a host
country regarding residual diplomatic immunity in several lawsuits
brought by domestic servants against their diplomatic employers
following the completion of the diplomat's official service.55 Under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, during the period of a
diplomatic agent's accreditation the agent enjoys near absolute
immunity from civil jurisdiction. 56 Because the purpose of such
diplomatic immunity is not to benefit individuals, but to ensure the
efficient performance of diplomatic missions in representing States,
once an individual ceases to be a diplomatic agent in a receiving
state, the scope of that individual's immunity is limited to that set
forth in Article 39(2), which provides:
When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities
have come to an end, such privileges and immunity shall normally
cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or on expiry of a
reasonable period of time in which to do so, but shall subsist until that
time, even in case of armed conflict. However, with respect to acts
performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a member
of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist.5 7
54. See, e.g., Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2009); see also
Montuya v. Chedid, 779 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2011).
55. In Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), for example, a
former domestic servant sued her former employers, including the former Permanent
Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, for alleged violations of
various laws against forced labor, human trafficking, and involuntary servitude. The
State Department advised the court to consider whether the former diplomat's
employment of the plaintiff was an "official act" carried out as a member of the mission
such that he might enjoy residual immunity under Article 39(2) of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 48. See Statement of Interest of the
United States at 4-10, Baoanan, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 08 Civ. 5692
(VM)) [hereinafter Baoanan Statement of Interest]. The court adopted our proposed
approach and determined that the employment of the plaintiff was a private act, and
therefore the former diplomat had no residual immunity under the VCDR. Baoanan,
627 F. Supp. 2d at 169-70. Similarly, in Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir.
2010), a former domestic servant filed suit against a Kuwaiti diplomat, his wife, and
the State of Kuwait, claiming violations of the ATCA and New York state labor law
based on alleged slavery and slavery-like practices. The district court determined that
the acts alleged by the former domestic servant in her case were private and non-
official in nature, such that the former diplomats were not shielded by residual
immunity. In our statement of interest filed on appeal to the Second Circuit, we
reiterated our longstanding position that a former diplomat enjoys residual immunity
under the VCDR, customary international law, and state practice only for those acts
performed in exercise of his or her diplomatic functions. Statement of Interest of the
United States at 14-15, Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 9-2525-
cv (L)).
56. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 48, art. 31.
57. Id. art. 39(2).
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A former diplomat thus enjoys residual immunity only for those
official acts that were performed in the exercise of his or her functions
as a member of the mission.58
Fourth, at appropriate times we have acknowledged special
missions immunity.59 This is a durationally limited status immunity
established in international law that applies to diplomatic missions
that are temporary and transient, rather than permanent, in nature.
It would, for example, extend limited immunity to a sitting high-level
foreign official who visits the United States on diplomatic business at
the invitation of the U.S. Government, but only for such time as the
person is present in the United States on the official visit, and for the
limited function of facilitating high-level contacts between
governments. The United States has recognized special missions
immunity several times to provide foreign officials with immunity
from personal service of process while on the diplomatic mission.60
This form of immunity does not address the official's underlying
immunity from suit based on the nature of his or her conduct, and the
State Department's role in ascertaining and asserting it rests upon
the President's constitutional authority over foreign affairs, including
the enumerated power to receive ambassadors and public ministers.
58. See Baoanan Statement of Interest, supra note 55, at 5. As explained by a
leading diplomatic law expert, residual immunity is limited to official acts because
such acts "are in law the acts of the sending State. It has therefore always been the
case that the diplomat cannot be sued in respect of such acts since this would be
indirectly to implead the sending State." EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAw:
COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 439 (3d ed.
2008).
59. In the Minister Bo case, practitioners of the Falun Gong spiritual
movement sued the sitting Chinese Minister of Commerce for actions he allegedly took
in a prior governmental post, and purported to serve Minister Bo while he was in
Washington, D.C. on a special diplomatic mission. Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai, 568 F. Supp.
2d 35, 36 (D.D.C. 2008). After the federal district court solicited the views of the State
Department, we filed a suggestion of immunity and statement of interest, asking the
court to find that Minister Bo, as a member of a special diplomatic mission, was
immune from service of process and therefore not subject to the court's jurisdiction.
Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest at 4, Li Weixum, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35
(D.D.C. 2008) (Civ. No. 04-0649 (RJL)). The district court agreed, and noted that the
Executive's authority to assert such immunity (for senior ministers who are part of a
special diplomatic mission) derives from customary international law and the
President's powers to conduct foreign affairs and receive foreign ministers. See Li
Weixum, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 37-38 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 464, cmt. i ("High officials of a foreign state
and their staffs on an oflicial visit or in transit. . .enjoy immunities like those of
diplomatic agents when the effect of exercising jurisdiction against the individual
would be to violate the immunity of the foreign state.")).
60. See, e.g., Baoanan, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155.
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C. Non-Samantar Procedural Issues
The foregoing "non-Samantar status cases" should not be
confused with what I call "non-Samantar procedural cases," in which
the issue of foreign official immunity is not squarely presented
because of a threshold flaw such as lack of personal jurisdiction,
improper service of process, forum non conveniens, the absence of
necessary parties, or because the official is not the real party in
interest (i.e., in reality is being sued in her official capacity). The
Samantar Court took care to say that where the foreign state is the
real party in interest, the case should be treated as one against the
state itself, with the result that it would be governed by the FSIA and
the common law issue of foreign official immunity would not arise.61
In Samantar, by contrast, Somalia was neither a necessary party nor
a real party in interest, and the Court noted that the suit against
Samantar was being brought against a former foreign official in his
personal capacity. 62
Relatedly, where the foreign state is a necessary party, the case
may not be able to proceed in its absence. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Pimentel,63 for example, the Supreme Court recently
indicated that a civil lawsuit should generally be dismissed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 when it may prejudice an absent
sovereign, observing that "where sovereign immunity is asserted, and
the claims of the sovereign are not frivolous, dismissal of the action
must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to the interests
of the absent sovereign."
Some cases may be dismissed even before reaching the merits
under other sections of the Federal Rules, such as Rule 12(b)(3) and
its requirement of proper venue. In making immunity
determinations, it is well-recognized that the State Department may
consider such factors as the connections of the parties and the case to
the United States and the availability of other fora.64 And the
Supreme Court has held, in Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia
61. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292 (2010).
62. Id.
63. 553 U.S. 851, 867 (2008).
64. Basic principles of sovereignty provide that a state has the right to exercise
jurisdiction over persons in its own territory and its permanent inhabitants. See The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) ("The jurisdiction
of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute."). Thus,
foreign sovereign immunity is not a principle of universal immunity, but rather a
principle that, when it applies, reserves for the official's own state the authority to
establish jurisdiction and seek accountability for official misconduct. See Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 61 (Feb. 14)
(foreign officials "enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their own
countries, and may thus be tried by those countries' courts in accordance with the
relevant rules of domestic law").
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International Shipping Corp.,6 5 that although a federal court
generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first
determining that it has jurisdiction over the matter (subject-matter
jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction), a federal court
can presume, rather than dispositively decide, its jurisdiction before
dismissing under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Thus, even if
uncertainty exists about the ultimate scope of a defendant's
immunity, a federal court may independently review the availability
of other fora and dismiss a case at the outset under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.66
Alternatively, a case that involves inappropriate service against
a foreign official or his or her diplomatic mission may be dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(5), for insufficient service of process. Thus, for
example, if a plaintiff attempts to serve an individual who enjoys
personal inviolability and cannot be effectively served in the United
States, the court should dismiss even before reaching the issue of the
defendant's immunity because the process itself has not yet properly
reached the defendant. 67
D. The Sound of Silence
At this writing, we are in the early days of the New Samantar
Process. As noted above, some of the overarching criticisms of the pre-
FSIA executive suggestions of immunity were a perception of
insufficient process, inconsistent results, and concern about too much
political pressure being brought to bear on the State Department. We
hope our new post-Samantar process will cure those problems and
represent a more modern, reliable approach.
To accomplish the complex task of separating Samantar from
non-Samantar issues and unraveling fact-based questions involving
procedural issues and the status of parties, the Office of the Legal
Adviser, at the Secretary of State's request, has developed a process
whereby, after careful initial review of the matter, we solicit
information from attorneys on both sides of a Samantar case. While
we do not invite litigants to participate in a formal adversarial
process with rigid administrative procedures, we do offer to meet with
counsel on both sides, ask them to provide factual information and
make their arguments as to whether or not official immunity should
apply, and invite counsel to contribute written materials. If we
believe a true Samantar issue is at stake, we will ask both sides to
answer a standard list of questions regarding the various factual
issues that might be relevant to such a determination. We have
applied this flexible approach because cases differ considerably in
65. 549 U.S. 422 (2007).
66. See id. at 429-35; Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247 (1981).
67. See Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205, 221-24 (2d Cir. 2004).
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complexity, in the degree to which Department officials are already
familiar with the issues and the legal doctrines, and in the resources
of the parties. The lawyers in my office who handle these issues,
particularly from the Office of Diplomatic Law and Litigation, have
extensive familiarity with the international practice and domestic law
precedents, often more than a private counsel taking his or her first
case involving international law.
Sometimes, and notably, the State Department will make a
conscious decision not to speak at the end of this process. We have
long noted that the U.S. Government need not and should not speak
in every case. As Justice Harlan observed in the Sabbatino case,
"Often the State Department will wish to refrain from taking an
official position, particularly at a moment that would be dictated by
the development of private litigation but might be inopportune
diplomatically."68 In deciding whether and when to speak in official
immunity cases, we will also balance the potential benefits of
participation against the notion that it is better to file in situations
where our pleadings will have the most impact. Obviously the State
Department has a greater interest in participating when a case
reaches an appellate level than when it is at the earliest pre-trial
stages, and could be dismissed on other grounds and for other reasons
that have nothing to do with foreign policy. Generally speaking, we
want to be responsive when courts request our views, and if we do not
file, we often note that no inference should be drawn from our
decision not to participate in the case.
What if the State Department chooses to stay silent? Samantar
suggests that absent a case-specific State Department determination,
U.S. courts should, as in the pre-FSIA period, decide questions of
immunity in conformity with principles articulated by the State
Department. As one Supreme Court case put it:
[i]n the absence of recognition of the claimed immunity by the political
branch of the government, the courts may decide for themselves
whether all the requisites of immunity exist. That is to say, it is for
them to decide whether the vessel when seized was that of a foreign
government and was of a character and operated under conditions
entitling it to the immunity in conformity to the principles accepted by
the department of the government charged with the conduct of our
foreign relations.
6 9
Following the 1952 Tate Letter, courts consistently applied the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity articulated by the State
Department even in cases where the Department did not make a
case-specific determination.
68. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 436 (1964).
69. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1945) (emphasis
added).
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The Supreme Court in Samantar echoed that directive, noting
that under the common law if the Executive Branch chooses not to
participate in the litigation, district courts must consider whether a
foreign sovereign or foreign official defendant is entitled to immunity
under "the established policy of the [State Department]."To The clear
import is that the more the State Department establishes an official
immunity policy over time, the more silent we can afford to be in most
cases. 71
At this conference, some have asked whether the courts should
give absolute deference, substantial deference, reasonable deference,
or some other measure of deference to State Department suggestions.
Yet depending upon our practice, this may well turn out to be a non-
issue. For so long as our own determinations of immunity are
reasonable, soundly rooted in a close examination- of the facts, a
diligent sorting of Samantar from non-Samantar issues, and careful
considerations of precedents from both common law and customary
international law, the courts will likely defer to them. Only if our
suggestions of immunity became unreasonable, it seems to me, would
courts be tempted to explore the delicate and uncharted zone between
"substantial deference" and "absolute deference" to executive branch
immunity determinations.
In closing, let me say that in time, we hope that litigants will
come to understand, with respect to State Department submissions in
these cases, both the "sound of silence" and the notion that
government silence is sometimes golden. In domestic litigation, our
ultimate goal is, in fact, not more verbiage, but more silence. The
government need not, and should not, speak in every case, and that is
not what Samantar envisages, particularly when those cases are
brought not by the U.S. Government, but by private litigants with
their own motives and goals.
Sometimes, less is more. If the State Department says less but
speaks clearly when it does speak, litigants and courts should be able
to use our broader pronouncements to sort out government
perspectives and revise their own positions accordingly. At the end of
the day, a careful sorting of Samantar from non-Samantar issues and
these nuances regarding the sound of silence may mark the most
fundamental differences between the old process of executive
suggestion and the New Samantar Process.
70. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
71. This, I submit, is the ultimate antidote to the claimed workload burden
that some have suggested Samantar will place upon the State Department. See, e.g.,
supra note 30. If the U.S. Government does not feel compelled to file in every case
brought against a foreign official, the burden may prove to be far less than many fear.
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